Assessing the assignation of public subsidies: Do the experts choose the most efficient R and D projects? [WP] by Duch Brown, Néstor et al.
 
                  DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL  
DE LA FACULTAT D’ECONOMIA I EMPRESA 
 
 
                         
 
Col·lecció d’Economia 
E08/207 
 
Assessing the assignation of public subsidies: Do the experts choose 
the most efficient R&D projects? 
 
 
Néstor Duch-Brown, José García-Quevedo and Daniel Montolio 
 
 
 
 
 
Adreça correspondència:  
All at the Barcelona Institute of Economics 
University of Barcelona 
Av. Diagonal 690, 08034, Barcelona, Spain.  
Contact: nduch@ub.edu, jgarciaq@ub.edu, montolio@ub.edu. 
 
Acknowledgements: We thank the Centre d’Innovació i Desenvolupament Empresarial (CIDEM), 
and its research department particularly, for both the information used in this paper as well as their 
help in data treatment and management. José García-Quevedo acknowledges support from grants 
SEJ2007-65806 and 2005SGR00285. Daniel Montolio acknowledges support form grants SEJ2006-
15212 and 2005SGR00285. 
  
Abstract: The implementation of public programs to support business R&D 
projects requires the establishment of a selection process. This selection 
process faces various difficulties, which include the measurement of the 
impact of the R&D projects as well as selection process optimization among 
projects with multiple, and sometimes incomparable, performance indicators. 
To this end, public agencies generally use the peer review method, which, 
while presenting some advantages, also demonstrates significant drawbacks. 
Private firms, on the other hand, tend toward more quantitative methods, such 
as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), in their pursuit of R&D investment 
optimization. In this paper, the performance of a public agency peer review 
method of project selection is compared with an alternative DEA method.  
Keywords: subsidies, R&D, DEA, “peer review”  
JEL: O32, C61, H25 
 
Resumen: La implementación de un programa de subvenciones públicas a 
proyectos empresariales de I+D comporta establecer un sistema de selección 
de proyectos. Esta selección se enfrenta a problemas relevantes, como son la 
medición del posible rendimiento de los proyectos de I+D y la optimización 
del proceso de selección entre proyectos con múltiples y a veces 
incomparables medidas de resultados. Las agencias públicas utilizan 
mayoritariamente el método peer review que, aunque presenta ventajas, no 
está exento de críticas. En cambio, las empresas privadas con el objetivo de 
optimizar su inversión en I+D utilizan métodos más cuantitativos, como el 
Data Envelopment Análisis (DEA). En este trabajo se compara la actuación de 
los evaluadores de una agencia pública (peer review) con una metodología 
alternativa de selección de proyectos como es el DEA. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Support for R&D and the innovation process plays a central role in the 
public policies of developed countries and is based on arguments for which a 
wide consensus exists. Among the reasons for public intervention the most 
fundamental is market failure, which can cause R&D investment to be, without 
the public intervention, lower than the socially optimal (Arrow, 1962; Klette et 
al., 2000). Although the reasons for public support are well established in the 
literature as well as in practice, it is necessary to examine the degree of 
efficiency of this support. 
 
In recent years, public policy evaluation has acquired growing 
importance, with the primary objectives being determination of policy impact as 
well as examination of additional effect generation. Although results are not 
entirely conclusive, in the case of R&D subsidies, some studies (David et al., 
2000; García-Quevedo, 2004) indicate the existence of an additionality effect. 
These are ex–post evaluations of selected and already publicly subsidized 
projects however, and as such, the degree of additionality and even its existence 
is closely related with the ex–ante evaluation as well as the selection process. 
This relationship has only rarely been studied. 
 
In general, public agencies across Europe and in the United States use the 
peer review method to select and assign subsidies to business R&D projects. 
Although this method presents certain advantages, it also has some drawbacks. 
Private firms, on the other hand, use more quantitative methods such as Multiple 
Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) or Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to 
optimize their R&D investment and to select and rank their feasible projects 
(Linton et al., 2002). 
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The objective of this paper is to examine two differing approaches to the 
evaluation and assignment of public subsidies to business R&D projects, peer 
review and DEA, and to analyze which methodology is preferable. This topic is 
not very well documented in the literature, primarily because of data 
availability. Nevertheless, the existence of a database containing information on 
both subsidized and unsubsidized R&D projects, with individual information for 
each project as well as evaluations made by external experts hired by the public 
agency allows us to examine if evaluators are choosing the most “efficient” 
projects. In other words, it allows us to evaluate the evaluators. 
 
Although there are differences between the project evaluation objectives 
of a public agency and a private firm, both entities seek to identify those projects 
which are superior in all relevant dimensions and, in turn, guarantee that the 
selected projects have a high potential to generate economic benefits. In order to 
evaluate both private and public project selection objectives, we propose a two-
stage methodology. First, we compare grading obtained by each evaluator 
assigning a particular grade to a project (peer review) with grading obtained by 
means of the DEA technique. Second, using the Propensity Score Matching 
technique, we analyze which set of selected projects (graded with peer review or 
DEA) is able to reach the objectives set by the agency. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the different methods of 
selection of R&D projects are examined and their advantages and disadvantages 
are discussed. In section 3, the database is described and estimates of the DEA 
scores are obtained and compared with those obtained by the peer review 
method used by the public agency. Section 4 presents the second-stage, which 
analyzes if there is a differential impact between the projects selected by the 
agency and those that would be selected using the DEA method. Section 5 
concludes. 
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2. Methods of R&D projects selection 
 
The design of a public program of subsidies to business R&D projects 
requires defining a selection and ranking system in order to decide which 
projects should be supported. The decision criteria of the agency should be part 
of the evaluation of a public program because, as the structural models on this 
subject show (David et al., 2000), such decision criteria in the selection of 
projects has as major impact on the results of the program as well as on the 
effect of the subsidies. 
 
In their calls for applications, public agencies define, with varying degrees 
of precision, the criteria for the selection of projects to be subsidized. In 
principle, these criteria should be oriented to the objective of correcting market 
failures so that subsidies to firms generate, in the presence of spillovers, the 
appropriate incentives for an efficient allocation of resources. Frequently, 
however, other objectives appear in the decisions of the agencies (Blanes and 
Busom, 2004). Such objectives can include, among others, support for specific 
technologies or sectors, development of projects with high diffusion capacity 
and profound economic impact, or giving priority to projects which generate 
behavioral additionality by stimulating, for example,  cooperation among firms 
(OECD, 2006).  
 
The process of selection and ranking of projects for the allocation of 
subsidies faces substantial difficulties which stem both from the limited 
information available to the agency in general as well as from the existence of 
information asymmetries. This is particularly true in the case of R&D projects, 
which are characterized by a high degree of complexity and uncertainty. The 
selection process seeks to find the value of the project’s contribution to 
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technological advancement, as well as its economic potential and the need for 
public funding (Feldman and Kelley, 2003). The most common method used in 
the United States, the European Union, and in the majority of national and 
regional agencies is the peer review system. The European Union, in its 7th 
R&D Framework Program, emphasizes that expert evaluation is at the core of 
both the selection system as well as the concession of financial support. 
Furthermore, the National Academy of Sciences in the United States also 
considers that the most effective way to evaluate R&D projects is by peer 
review.  
 
The peer review system presents substantial advantages in the evaluation 
and selection of projects, particularly in terms of independence, impartiality, and 
transparency. It also brings in expert knowledge in the evaluation of 
technological projects, expertise which can often be difficult for the agency to 
have internally. Peer review also presents significant limitations, however, and 
is not free of criticism.  
 
In the specific case of subsidies to business R&D, the main criticism has 
been conservative and institutional bias (Brezis, 2007). Conservative bias relates 
to the tendency to reject inventive projects which may suppose substantial 
innovations but far from existing technology and, therefore, difficult to evaluate. 
This tendency, which favors the approval of conventional projects, can have 
negative effects on the impact of subsidies at the productivity level. Similarly, 
institution bias means that firms of a certain size and which have R&D 
experience are favored in the concession of subsidies. Other limitations which 
appear in the peer review method are the difficulties which an agency may face 
in identifying appropriate experts, the subjectivity of those experts found, as 
well as possible conflict of interest, especially in areas of small territorial 
dimension (Rigby, 2002). In addition to the aforementioned limitations, the use 
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of external experts can also represent substantial cost to the agency, in both time 
spent on the evaluation process as well as in remuneration of the experts. In the 
case of the European Union, which has a database of 50,000 experts for their 
R&D programs, around 5,000 annual evaluations are requested. This figure 
represents an estimated cost of nearly 2% of the total budget of each program in 
question. 
 
Private firms must also establish a ranking for their portfolio of R&D 
projects as well as value each project in accordance with its expected rate of 
return. The fact is, however, that measurement of the potential of the available 
project portfolio to optimize selection among a wide group of generally 
incomparable projects is problematic. Likewise, it is also difficult to measure a 
project’s expected rate of return. Although numerous methods have been 
considered, a definite solution has not been reached (Linton et al., 2002). One 
adequate option is to use quantitative measurements for each projected 
possibility, such as current net value or other financial methods. It is clear, 
however, that an approach such as this is insufficient because it does not capture 
the broad complexity of an R&D project. In consequence, alternative 
quantitative methods have been proposed. Among these, the DEA method is of 
special interest because it may be of particular use in the selection and 
classification of R&D projects, especially projects which are characterized by a 
high degree of uncertainty (Linton et al., 2002; Linton et al., 2007). 
 
The DEA method presents as its main advantage the ability to 
simultaneously analyze multiple inputs and outputs; it does not require the 
supposition of specific functional forms which relate inputs with outputs. It also 
allows the comparison of the analysis units either among themselves or with a 
subset. DEA also presents some limitations, however, in that it is an extreme 
point technique in which measurement errors can cause significant problems. It 
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is also a non-parametric technique and as a consequence, statistical tests can be 
difficult to implement. Furthermore, DEA gives relative efficiency 
measurements but not absolute efficiency measurements, and therefore results 
with a “theoretical maximum” cannot be compared. However, this characteristic 
of offering relative efficiency results is appropriate to the objectives of our 
analysis. The purpose of using the DEA is to choose, among all projects, those 
which achieve a maximum output with a specific input level. In this case, the 
results of the DEA should be interpreted as a way to rank projects and to 
compare among them. 
 
3. Peer-review vs. DEA.  Methodological proposal and case study 
 
To compare peer-review with the alternative DEA method of project 
selection, we make use of data from R&D public subsidies granted by the 
Agency for Innovation and Business Development (CIDEM) of Catalonia 
(Spain). Since 2004, this agency has called for subsidies to promote R&D 
projects. In this paper, we analyze the 2005 call for R&D subsidies for firms 
operating in the high technology sector. The available database includes detailed 
information on the characteristics of applicant firms, of the R&D projects 
presented, and of the scores that external experts gave to the projects, the so 
called peer review scores.  The scores given by experts are used by an agency 
committee in the selection and subsequent ranking of projects. 
 
The criteria that the Agency has established in the call for R&D subsidies 
for the evaluation of projects are presented in Table 1. The six criteria can be 
grouped into the three main objectives of Agency:  
 
• Development of technologically outstanding projects that have a potential 
to generate spillovers (“technological contribution”). 
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• Economic impact of projects in terms of Gross Value Added and/or R&D 
investment (“economic potential”).  
• Impact on other sectors and firms (“behavioral effect”). 
 
Firms which want to obtain an R&D subsidy must first present an 
application with information (qualitative and quantitative) about the firm and the 
R&D project. Then, in accordance with each established criteria, external 
experts evaluate the projects and give a score which allows all presented projects 
to be ranked. Finally, a committee organized by the agency uses this information 
to determine which projects will receive subsidies and the percentage of the total 
cost of the selected projects to be subsidized. In the present study, the original 
dataset contains information for 216 projects, 52% of which obtained a subsidy. 
 
Table 1. Agency’s objectives and criteria for selecting R&D strategic projects. 
Objectives of the 
Agency  Specific criteria  
Technological 
contribution  
• Technological relevance and technical viability of 
the project.  
• Increase in the capacity of the applicant's R&D. 
Economic potential  • Socioeconomic impact. 
• Contribution to the internationalization of the 
economy. 
• Consolidation of the firm in the market. 
Behavioral effect  • Cooperation with other agents and diffusion of 
results  
Source: own elaboration from the order TRI/163/2005 of April 13, DOGC 4369. 
 
With this selection method of R&D projects in mind, we present the DEA 
technique as an alternative, one which requires choosing criteria that can be 
quantified. As such, we have deleted from the original database all those 
projects without relevant data, and have come up with a final number of 148 
projects. The available information comes from the applications of the projects 
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and includes data not only for 2005 but also for 2004 as well as 2006. This 
information allows carrying out robustness exercises of the estimated DEA 
scores. 
 
Table 2. Agency’s objectives and output measures.  
Objectives of the 
Agency  Measures of Output  
Technological 
contribution  
• Output 1: Estimate of new R&D projects as a result 
of the project (2005-2006). Expressed in €.  
Economic potential  • Output 2a: Estimate of the contribution of the project 
to firm’s exports (2005-2006). Expressed in %.  
• Output 2b: Estimate of industrial investments 
induced by project (2005-2006). Expressed in €.  
Behavioral effect  • Output 3: Estimate of subcontracted activity in R&D 
(2005-2006). Expressed in %.  
Note: as a robustness exercise DEA scores have been carried out using output data for 2005 
and 2006 (separately) and for the sum and mean of both years. 
 
 
DEA methodology, which is presented in detail in Charnes et al. (1978) 
and in Coelli et al. (1998), requires defining inputs and outputs which are 
common to all projects. In the case of the selection of R&D projects, and 
following Linton et al. (2002, 2007), we consider the cost of the project as input. 
The definition of outputs should respond to the objectives of the agency. In the 
case of the private sector, Linton et al. (2002, 2007) use as output different 
estimates of the discounted cash flow estimated for the project. In the 
concession of public subsidies to promote R&D, the objectives of the agency are 
essentially to promote technological advancement, to foment economic growth, 
and to provoke behavioral changes in the firms by means of an increase in 
cooperation among firms, which favors knowledge diffusion. In accordance with 
these objectives and starting from the available statistical information, Table 2 
presents the chosen outputs. In addition, Table 3 presents the main descriptive 
statistics of the 148 projects analyzed. 
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Once inputs and outputs are defined, the procedure maximizes outputs for 
a given level of inputs assuming a variable returns to scale (VRS) production 
function. In our framework, the VRS hypothesis seems adequate since all 
projects are compared to each other while still retaining different dimensions in 
inputs and outputs. 
 
Table 3. Input/Output descriptive statistics 
 Mean  Std. dev. Min.  Max. 
Input  848,555.5 1,791,711.0 60,269.8 15,806,918 
Output 1  571,432.0 2,604,700.9 0.0 31,000,000.0 
Output 2a  27,3% 46,0% 0% 100% 
Output 2b  517,242.8 1,231,134.2 0.0 10,037,000.0 
Output 3  4,8% 12,6% 0,0% 45.0% 
Note: the descriptive statistics for the 148 projects correspond to output values for 2006. 
 
 
The DEA scores are indexes of relative efficiency (project scores) and 
should be interpreted merely as a form of ordering the projects. This procedure 
allows the selection of those projects which obtain a maximum output (objective 
of the agency) given a certain level of input (cost). Efficiency indexes range 
from 0 (inefficient) to 1 (efficient). However, this range of DEA scores does not 
permit a full ordering of projects, especially among those which the DEA 
considers to be efficient (with a score equal to 1). To solve this problem the 
super-efficiency option of DEA techniques allow the assignment of values 
higher than 1 to efficient projects, reducing the number of projects with the same 
score and allowing a more precise ranking of projects. Allowing for super-
efficiency, DEA efficiency scores are distributed between 0 and 10. 
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The efficiency scores allow a precise ranking of projects. The resulting 
ranking is compared with the one obtained for the peer-review. To compare the 
degree of similarity between both methods we consider the number of projects 
approved by the experts (93 of 148). If we look at the first 93 projects from the 
DEA ranking we find that the degree of similarity between both distributions of 
approved/refused projects is around 14-16%. Therefore, the degree of similarity 
between the scores of the peer-review and the DEA is rather low, indicating that 
the two project selection methodologies give different results. 
 
To further compare both methodologies, we also perform an exercise 
which considers the 50 best projects in both rankings (see Table 4). Nearly half 
of the projects considered as efficient under the peer-review methodology also 
obtained a high score using the DEA technique. In the case of projects refused 
by the experts, there is a 73% coincidence with the DEA results (72 of 98), 
while 26 projects refused with peer-review were approved when given the score 
received with DEA. Summarizing, as a global measure of similarity between 
ranking methodologies we find that peer-review and DEA have a 65% 
coincidence in the final evaluation (approved/refused) of projects, with a 35% 
difference in the final evaluation of projects granted by either one or the other 
methodology. 
 
Table 4. Assignment of projects (approved/refused) according to methodology  
 Approved DEA  Refused DEA  Total  
Approved peer-
review  24 26 50 
Refused peer-
review 26 72 98 
Total  50 98 148 
Note: DEA results obtained with 1 input, 4 outputs (data for 2006), and assuming VRS. 
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4. Evaluating peer review and DEA. A second stage in the project selection 
process 
 
The results of the previous section show a low correlation between the 
projects selected by each method of ex–ante evaluation. This seemingly 
contradictory conclusion calls for the comparison of the expected results of each 
set of projects in order to be able to determine if one is socially preferable to the 
other. If the objective of the agency is to generate the maximum possible impact, 
defined as the attainment of a higher social profitability derived from the co-
financing of these projects, then it is necessary to compare the additionality that 
would be generated in each of the two scenarios. 
 
Figure 1. DEA results 
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Note: DEA results calculated for values of outputs in 2006. Robustness exercises show that 
DEA scores vary little if the sum of the 2005 and 2006 outputs or the average value of both 
data is used. More precisely, correlations between different scores are higher than 90%. 
 
 
Clearly, the ideal procedure to carry out an evaluation would be to 
observe the same unit (firm) in two different situations at the same time: to 
analyze its results both with treatment (subsidy) and without (non treatment or 
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control). Since this is impossible, it is necessary to control for the counterfactual 
situation, that is, for what would happen in the case contrary to the one which 
the unit really faces. To do that, it is possible to use a non-parametric association 
method known as Propensity Score Matching (PSM). Starting with the work of 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), PSM has been increasingly used in the evaluation 
of public policy. In the case of studies that perform R&D subsidies evaluation, 
this method has been used recurrently in recent years (Duch et al., 2006; Herrera 
and Heijs, 2007; Almus and Czarnitski, 2003, among others). The PSM is a 
method that allows estimation of the average effect of the treatment on units that 
receive it (denominated Average Effect of Treatment of the Treated or ATT), 
observing the performance variable exposed to treatment (“factual state”) (Y1) 
against the non treated (“counterfactual state”) (Y0).  
 
An estimate of the propensity score (PS) is not enough to compute the 
ATT, as the probability of observing two units with exactly the same PS tends to 
zero. A way of matching treated and control units is found in looking for the 
control unit with the most similar PS for each treated unit, a process called 
nearest neighbor matching (NNM). Although it is not strictly necessary, the 
method is usually applied with substitution, in the sense that a unit of the control 
group can be the best match for more than one treated unit. Once each treated 
unit is matched with a corresponding control unit, the difference between the 
performance of the treated units and that of the control units is obtained. The 
ATT is then obtained as the median of these differences.  
 
It is obvious; however, that some of these matches could be quite poor, as 
for some treated units the nearest neighbors can have a very different PS, despite 
contributing equally to the estimation of the ATT independently of their 
distances. With the kernel estimator, all units in the treatment group are matched 
with a weighted average of all units in the control group with weights that are 
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inversely proportional to the distance of the PS of those treated and those in the 
control group. It is clear from the previous considerations that these two 
methods can derive different results, mainly in terms of the tradeoff between the 
quality and the quantity of the matching, with none of them being a priori 
superior to the other. Their simultaneous consideration, nevertheless, offers a 
way to analyze the robustness of the estimates. 
 
Despite the growing popularity of PSM, relatively little has been written 
on the problem of variable selection. Some studies based on simulations 
(Brookhart et al. 2006, Judkins et al. 2007) show that selection of the variables 
which are included in the calculation of the PS can affect the bias, or the 
variance and the average quadratic error of an estimate of the ATT. These 
studies in turn suggest that variables not related to the treatment but related to 
the result should always be included in the calculation of the PS. On the other 
hand, the inclusion of variables related to treatment but not to results has been 
seen to increase the variance of the ATT without reducing the bias. For the 
calculation of the PS, variables referring to firms’ characteristics are used. These 
include sales, the number of workers, and the number of years the firm has been 
operating in the market. Several dummy variables are also included, which 
indicate if the firm operates in a high technology manufacturing sector, in a 
knowledge-intensive services sector and, finally, if it is located in the 
metropolitan area of Barcelona. 
 
The following tables show the results of ex–post evaluation under the two 
described scenarios; the selection of projects through the agency’s peer-review 
(ATT-A) and the selection of projects through the DEA method (ATT-D) using 
the described estimators. For this evaluation exercise, we use both the R&D 
intensity (R&D as a percentage of sales) to proxy financial additionality as well 
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as the percentage of research subcontracted by firms to proxy behavioral 
additionality. 
 
Departing from the data used in the previous section, we add projects by 
firm and then filter some outliers. We end with data for 112 firms. From the 
information provided by the Agency, we have 67 firms that actually received a 
subsidy and the other 45 we have as a control group. Since we have computed 
the efficiency scores for these firms, we rank them in descending order and we 
assume that those with the highest efficiency scores would have received a 
subsidy had the agency used it as a selection mechanism. As in the previous 
case, those firms with low efficiency scores act as controls for treated firms 
under DEA. In so doing, we are thus able to compare the two sets of firms, those 
actually subsidized by the agency and those with potentially more efficient R&D 
projects selected through the DEA method. 
 
As indicated in Table 5, even if both methods select different projects to 
be subsidized, the results on the ATT show that both actually discriminate for 
the best projects. We can see from the table that in both cases, although with 
differences in terms of statistical significance, treated firms show a higher R&D 
intensity than firms in the control group. These results are robust since the 
conclusions that can be extracted are the same for the two estimators considered. 
The results shown in the table indicate that, on average, treated firms selected by 
the DEA method would have a slightly higher impact on financial additionality. 
 
The picture changes somewhat when considering the impact on behavioral 
additionality. Table 6 shows that only the treated firms selected with the DEA 
methodology have a significant statistical effect on the percentage of 
subcontracted research activities. Moreover, the estimated effect is substantial 
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and demonstrates that treated firms would show an approximately 10% higher 
percentage of subcontracted research activities than non-treated firms. 
 
Table 5. Impact on financial additionality  
ATT-A  ATT-D   
Coeff. T C Coeff. T C 
6.41 9.18 
NNM  (1.69*) 
[1.75*] 
61 26 (2.25**) 
[2.05**] 
62 23 
5.45 10.17 
Kernel  (-.-) 
[1.73*] 
61 39 (-.-) 
[2.76***] 
62 38 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Bootstrapping standard errors in brackets. T is the 
number of treated firms; C is the number of control firms. *, * * and * * * indicate statistical 
significance at 90, 95 and 99 percent, respectively. 
 
Table 6. Impact on behavioral additionality 
ATT-A  ATT-D   
Coeff. T C Coeff. T C 
0.53 10.63 
NNM  (0.01) 
[0.08] 
61 27 (2.94***) 
[2.34**] 
62 26 
1.37 9.77 
Kernel  (-.-) 
[0.27] 
61 39 (-.-) 
[2.47**] 
62 38 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Bootstrapping standard errors in brackets. T is the 
number of treated firms; C is the number of control firms. *, * * and * * * indicate statistical 
significance at 90, 95 and 99 percent, respectively. 
 
 
These results should be interpreted with care because of reduced sample 
size and the sensibility of PSM to the inclusion or omission of variables. Also, 
the impossibility of having pre-treatment and post-treatment data conditions the 
estimated ATT effects. That being said, the results clearly indicate that a more 
rigorous ex–ante evaluation is needed, given that the differing impacts of the 
R&D projects selected by the two methods point to different conclusions. In the 
absence of such an uncompromising ex–ante evaluation, it is possible to 
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conclude that R&D projects which do not conform to the objectives of the 
agency are in fact being subsidized. As such, the DEA method of project 
selection should be regarded as both a complement to the more traditional 
method of peer review evaluation as well as a demonstration of the importance 
of linking ex–ante with ex–post evaluation of R&D projects. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Support for innovation is a key element in the public policy of the 
European Union, the United States, and the majority of national and regional 
governments. Although the reasons which justify public support for business 
R&D are widely accepted, it is necessary to demonstrate that these public 
programs are effective. This need has lead to the growing use of evaluation 
analyses, particularly ex-post evaluation, to help determine if public intervention 
generates an additional effect.  
 
Within such evaluation analyses, one subject that has been largely 
overlooked is the question of whether ex-ante evaluation systems for the 
selection and the ranking of projects and the concession of subsidies are 
appropriate. The impact of public programs is closely related to project selection 
processes, as the results and additional effects of programs rely on precision in 
the selection of projects which both fulfill agency objectives as well as generate 
substantial impact.  
 
This research has sought to analyze and assess the adequacy of the ex-ante 
evaluation mechanisms used in the assignation of public subsidies to business 
R&D. The method most frequently used by public agencies in their evaluation 
of projects is evaluation by experts, or the peer review method. Private firms, on 
the other hand, use different methods to value and rank their R&D projects, in 
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accordance with the projects’ expected returns. These methods have a more 
quantitative character and, among them, the DEA has been seen to be 
particularly appropriate.  
 
In this paper, a methodology for the evaluation of the methods of selection 
for R&D projects and the concession of subsidies has been proposed. 
Accordingly, the applicability of this methodology has been demonstrated, using 
information drawn from the specific case of a regional agency business R&D 
project subsidy program. In short, the proposed methodology consists of 
comparing, in a first stage, the results of the peer review method with another 
possible method, specifically the DEA. In a second stage, a quasi-experimental 
technique of ex-post evaluation, Propensity Score Matching, has been used to 
estimate the results and additionality generated by both project selection 
methods.  
 
The results of the research show that the selection and classification of 
projects by peer review and DEA share a low correlation. In addition, a 
comparison of the results of the analyses of the simulation of the impact derived 
from projects selected by both methods shows the difficulty in reaching 
definitive conclusions about the superiority of peer review over another method. 
Although the peer review method can be preferable in the qualitative evaluation 
of projects as well as in the resolution of the problem of asymmetric 
information, results show both the convenience of supplementing it with other 
methods as well as the necessity to advance in the knowledge of ex-ante 
evaluation methods. The ideas proposed in this paper seek to improve available 
information as well as consider project ranking and selection an integral process 
which closely links ex–ante and ex–post evaluation.  
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Following similar studies (David et al., 2000; García-Quevedo, 2004), the 
results of this research point to the necessity of improving the evaluation 
procedures for R&D subsidies. Similarly, and in accordance with other recent 
analyses (Jaffe, 2002; Brezis, 2007), the research also highlights the 
convenience of examining the various alternative methods disposed to public 
agencies in their evaluation and subsequent selection of R&D projects. 
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